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Abstract This paper implements discrete-time survival models to ascertain the determi-
nants behind specific endings for terrorist groups during 1970–2007. Based on multinomial
logit regressions, we estimate the hazard probabilities associated with three endings for ter-
rorist groups: splintering from internal factors, being defeated by force, and joining the
political process or achieving victory. We find that different covariates differentially impact
each of these endings. In a second exercise, we split our sample of 586 terrorist groups into
those that started before and after the beginning of 1990. In so doing, we find that survival
factors differ between the two cohorts of groups. For both exercises, the determinants of
survival comprise terrorist groups’ goals, their tactics and size, and base-country character-
istics. Robustness tests conclude the paper.
Keywords Terrorist group survival · Multinomial logit analysis · Panel analysis ·
Alternative ending of terrorist groups
JEL Classification D74 · C41 · H56
1 Introduction
An understanding of why terrorist groups end their operations is absolutely essential for
effective counterterrorism policy, because this knowledge can enlighten policymakers as
to which groups are vulnerable from within, and which can be defeated through police or
military actions. If, for example, a terrorist group possesses the indicators of a group that
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will disintegrate internally, then the government is better advised to direct its limited coun-
terterrorism resources to more resilient groups (Jones and Libicki 2008). Terrorist groups
that are vulnerable from within can splinter from internal dissension among its members,
competition with rival groups, reduced popular support, or limited resource supplies. The
accumulation of nearly 40 years of terrorist event data, which often identify the perpetrating
terrorist group, permits researchers to track empirically the campaigns of terrorist groups.
Based on RAND (2012) terrorist event data for 1970–2006 and other information, Jones
and Libicki (2008) distinguished active terrorist groups from those that concluded opera-
tions for one of the following reasons: defeat by military or police, splintering from within,
joining the political process, or achieving one or more goals (i.e., victory). When observa-
tions on terrorist groups’ campaigns are combined with data on these groups’ characteristics
(e.g., sizes, ideologies, and goals), tactics, and base-country features, we can ascertain the
determinants behind various endings for terrorist groups.
Most previous studies of terrorist groups’ demises have not investigated the determi-
nants of specific types of endings (e.g., Blomberg et al. 2010; Gaibulloev and Sandler 2013;
Phillips 2013); rather, these earlier studies examined the factors behind terrorist groups stop-
ping operations for any reason. This presumes that the same factors are behind the various
endings of terrorist groups, which is clearly not true since the determinants of military anni-
hilation are likely different than those behind a group joining the political process. In a pio-
neering study, Blomberg et al. (2010) applied survival analysis to identify some factors that
resulted in a three-year hiatus in attacks by terrorist groups. A follow-up study by Blomberg
et al. (2011) identified factors behind terrorist groups’ failure, based on the conclusion of
terrorist operations, not just a hiatus in attacks. This is a desirable extension because terrorist
groups may engage in a cease-fire or else suspend operations for one or more years. Subse-
quently, Gaibulloev and Sandler (2013) relied on RAND event data to study factors behind
terrorist groups’ failures for 60 % more terrorist groups than analyzed in the Blomberg et al.
(2011) article. These three studies did not, however, identify the specific determinants of
the various types of endings for terrorist groups. Cronin (2006), however, analyzed some
interesting case studies for specific terrorist groups’ endings, but did not present a survival
analysis.
Carter (2012) is the first article to apply a competing-risk analysis to identify some de-
terminants that resulted in either internal dissolution or external defeat for terrorist groups.1
The focus of his survival analysis was the influence of state sponsorship. Carter (2012)
uncovered some evidence that state sponsorship hastened groups’ failures when this spon-
sorship took the form of providing a safe haven. Our paper also investigates why terrorist
groups end in alternative ways, but without a focus on state sponsorship. Unlike Carter
(2012), we divide groups’ internal dissolution into two competing risks—splintering and
joining the political process—since we view these risks as depending on vastly different
considerations. Splintering indicates within group failure to pursue a common goal, while
joining the political process suggests group unity in seeking goals by legitimate means. Ad-
ditionally, we focus on base-country, rather than target-country, characteristics, because we
believe that the survival of terrorist groups and the way in which they end is more geared to
where the groups take refuge, draw their support, and deploy their defenses than where they
1Daxecker and Hess (2013) also investigated the determinants of alternative endings of terrorist groups. Un-
like our current study, Daxecker and Hess (2013) focused on how government repression influenced terrorist
groups’ demises under alternative regimes—democracy and authoritarian. Their study excluded group splin-
tering and covered a shorter period than our study. Many other differences distinguish these two studies.
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dispatch their operatives to attack (Basuchoudhary and Shughart 2010). In contrast to previ-
ous competing risk studies, the current study assembles a richer set of independent variables
that account for the terrorist groups’ competitive environment, their tactics (e.g., intensity
and diversity of attacks), and environmental factors (e.g., the presence of multiple bases and
geographical considerations).
The primary purpose of our paper is the implementation of discrete-time duration mod-
els to estimate the underlying determinants of specific kinds of terrorist groups’ endings.2
During each year, an active terrorist group is at risk of alternative endings, i.e., being de-
feated by force, splintering from within, or joining the political process. We combine terror-
ist groups that achieve victory with those that enter the political process, since both types
of terrorist groups have joined the established political order. Using multinomial logit re-
gressions, we estimate the hazard probability for a sample of 586 terrorist groups that may
have concluded operations in one of these three ways. Terrorist groups that do not suc-
cumb to one of these three risks remain active throughout the 1970–2007 sample period.
A secondary purpose of our study is to ascertain the determinants of the demises of ter-
rorist groups that formed during two subperiods—1970–1989 and 1990–2007. This divi-
sion of time allows us to ascertain whether overall risk factors for terrorist groups dif-
fer between the earlier period when leftist and nationalist/separatist terrorists dominated
and the later period when religious fundamentalist terrorists dominated (Hoffman 2006;
Rapoport 2004).
Our analysis is rich in findings. Larger memberships make terrorist groups resilient to
any of the alternative ways of ending, but have the greatest marginal impact on internal
splintering. Relative to religious fundamentalists, terrorist groups formed around three other
ideologies—nationalist/separatist (henceforth, nationalist), left wing, and right wing—are
more likely to join the political process or achieve victory. This is especially true of nation-
alist terrorist groups, which supports the findings of Brathwaite (2013), who examined a
much smaller number of terrorist groups. Terrorist groups with broadly defined goals, such
as empire, regime change, or social revolution, are less inclined to join the political pro-
cess.3 This is also true of terrorist groups seeking territorial change. In addition, terrorist
groups with multiple home bases are less apt to end by force or splintering. Large base-
country population reduces the risk that terrorist groups will splinter or join the political
process. Base-country elevation and jungles limit terrorist groups’ risk of a military defeat,
presumably because the terrorist groups can better hide (also see Abadie 2006).
In the second exercise, we find numerous differences between the causes of demise for
terrorist groups that formed before and after 1990. Relative to religious fundamentalist ter-
rorist groups, the three other kinds of terrorist groups are more likely to end when the groups
started before 1990. Terrorist groups seeking empire, regime change, or social revolution are
less apt to end if they formed before 1990. Moreover, terrorist groups that want territorial
change are more resilient to failure. For terrorist groups that began before 1990, we find that
more terrorist attacks per million persons make the group more prone to failure. More attack
2With the availability of data on terrorist groups’ campaigns, many recent articles study terrorist groups’
activities. For example, Kilberg (2012) examined factors that affected a terrorist group’s choice of organiza-
tional structure in its effort to balance effectiveness and security. Brathwaite (2013) demonstrated that terrorist
organizations were more apt to adopt electoral strategies when they sought nationalist territorial goals.
3In a study of terrorist group emergence, Aksoy and Carter (2014) showed that terrorist groups with these
“anti-system” goals are less likely to emerge in democracies. Their findings about how groups’ goals de-
termine where terrorist groups emerge are consistent with our findings that terrorist groups with system-
consistent goals are more apt to join the political process.
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diversity displayed by the terrorist group is more conducive to survival before 1990, but not
after the beginning of 1990. Terrorist group competition within the base country increases
survival prospects for terrorist groups forming after, but not before, 1990. Other findings are
highlighted in the results section (Sect. 5).
2 Preliminaries
Terrorism is the premeditated use or threat to use violence by individuals or subnational
groups to obtain a political or social objective through the intimidation of a large audience
beyond that of the immediate victims (Enders and Sandler 2012). The two hallmarks of
terrorism are its violence and political/social objectives. Violent actions in the absence of
these goals merely are criminal acts for extortion or sociopathic reasons. Political or social
goals may involve making territorial demands, altering public policy, maintaining the status
quo, growing an empire, encouraging regime change, or fostering social revolution (Jones
and Libicki 2008). Terrorist groups support the status quo if they oppose policy changes
being pushed by the government or other political groups. Smaller terrorist groups make
more modest demands such as policy change, while larger terrorist groups seek grander
demands such as empire, regime change, or social revolutions (Jones and Libicki 2008).
In some instances, terrorist groups pursue regionwide regime change (i.e., empire)—e.g.,
Jemaah Islamiyah wants a pan-regional Islamic state.4 Our terrorism definition concurs with
that of RAND (2012) by identifying the perpetrator as individuals or subnational groups
so as to rule out state terror, wherein a government intimidates its own people. However,
our terrorism definition does not rule out state sponsorship in which a government aids the
terrorist group with resources, intelligence, safe haven, or other forms of support. Terrorist
groups want the intimidated audience to pressure the government to concede in order to
reduce anxiety levels (Gould and Klor 2010). The audience is particularly crucial for terrorist
campaigns in liberal democracies, whose legitimacy rests on the ability to protect citizens’
lives and property (Wilkinson 1986). Success in obtaining concessions can spur terrorist
groups to ratchet up their demands; this success can demonstrate to other terrorist groups
that terrorism is effective (Brandt and Sandler 2009).
3 Theoretical considerations
We view terrorist groups as engaged in rational decision making, consistent with much of
the extant literature (e.g., Enders and Sandler 1993; Landes 1978). Thus, terrorist groups
allocate their resources (i.e., labor, weapons, intelligence, and base(s) of operation) to max-
imize their utility, which increases with the achievement of their goals. For some groups,
this utility can increase with publicity for the cause as their attacks acquire notoriety. Mur-
derous attacks against nonbelievers by religious fundamentalist groups provide utility even
though no concessions are attained (Hoffman 2006). Terrorist groups allocate their resources
among attack modes (e.g., assassinations, bombings, or hostage taking) in order to achieve
the greatest expected marginal payoff per dollar spent (Berrebi and Lakdawalla 2007).
4Terrorist groups’ goals also figured in other recent studies. Asal and Rethemeyer (2008) showed that reli-
gious fundamentalist terrorist groups were more lethal. In the context of suicide terrorism, Horowitz (2010)
found that these fundamentalist terrorist groups were more apt to employ suicide terrorism. Piazza (2008)
showed that terrorist groups with “universal” or “abstract” political goals were more likely to engage in
suicide terrorism.
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When allocating their scarce resources, terrorist groups confront competing risks that
may lead them to end their operations. As measured by Jones and Libicki (2008), these risks
involve being defeated by police or military actions, disintegrating by internal splintering,
becoming part of the political process (e.g., the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland),
or achieving one or more goals through victory. If the terrorist group experiences none of
these endings, then it remains active. Each of these competing risks is influenced in different
ways by the following considerations: the terrorist groups’ resources, environmental factors
(e.g., the economic, political, and geographical aspects of the groups’ base country or coun-
tries), the groups’ orientation (i.e., their ideologies and goals), the groups’ tactics (i.e., diver-
sification and level of attacks), and government actions. Larger terrorist group memberships
should reduce all competing risks, especially in terms of police or military defeat. If the ter-
rorist group possesses multiple bases of operation, then these bases should limit the group’s
failure by splintering or force. For splintering, multiple bases of operation allow a terrorist
group to adopt alternative orientations, which can appease various viewpoints within the
group. Regarding defeat by force, multiple bases of operation mean that host countries must
join forces to eliminate the terrorist group, which rarely occurs (Enders and Sandler 2012).
Multiple bases may also signal greater state sponsorship, because two or more countries
implicitly permit the terrorist group to reside on their soils. Intergroup competition in the
base country may inhibit the terrorist groups from joining the political process or achieving
victory, because the government is unlikely to appease multiple viewpoints. In terms of en-
vironmental factors, high income per capita is more apt to result in defeat for the terrorist
group, because the host country has a large tax base from which to raise counterterrorism
funding. In contrast, adherence to democratic principles may reduce this possibility of de-
feat for the terrorist group owing to tighter constraint on executive power (Li 2005). Higher
elevations and thicker jungle cover provide the terrorists with more hiding opportunities,
which decrease the likelihood of defeat without necessarily influencing the other competing
risks. A larger base-country population is anticipated to limit the terrorist group’s ability to
join the political process or attain its demands owing to the likelihood of many opposing
views diluting the group’s political influence.
Relative to religious fundamentalists, we expect that left-wing, right-wing, and national-
ist terrorist groups have a greater likelihood of joining the political process or achieving one
or more of their demands. Religious fundamentalist terrorist groups pose a greater threat and
challenge to the existing order. Terrorist groups with more encompassing goals, such as ter-
ritorial change, empire, regime change, or social revolution, are less apt than terrorist groups
desiring policy change or the status quo from joining the political process or achieving vic-
tory. Since diversification pays, terrorist groups that rely on more attack modes should limit
their risks of military defeat or internal splintering. An enhanced terrorist campaign with
more attacks can increase the terrorist group’s resources, thereby limiting splintering and
promoting political legitimacy. Larger terrorist campaigns can also motivate the targeted
government to increase its counterterrorism response, which can increase the risk of defeat
or splintering. In general, military and/or government spending are expected to augment
terrorist groups’ risk of defeat.
Our second exercise is geared toward ascertaining whether the overall risk of terrorist
groups’ failure differs between the era of leftist terrorist dominance (before 1990) and the
era of religious fundamentalist terrorist dominance (after the start of 1990).5 Given the dif-
fering goals, ideologies, and tactics of the two types of terrorists, any differences in the risk
5Enders and Sandler (1999) showed that the pattern of transnational terrorism changed in the post-Cold War
era after the early 1990s. Our second exercise is motivated, in part, by this established stylized fact, which is
based on the changing nature of the dominant terrorist groups and much reduced state sponsorship.
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of terrorist groups’ failure between the two eras should be associated with these factors. That
is, elevation, jungle cover, democracy, and government spending in the base country are not
anticipated to differ in their influence on terrorist groups’ failure between the two eras. The
same should be true for regional location. Prior to 1990, we expect the more prevalent left-
wing, right-wing, and nationalist terrorist groups to be at a greater risk of failure relative
to religious terrorist groups. These latter terrorist groups were just getting started and were
flying under the radar before 1990. During the initial period, terrorist groups’ goals—e.g.,
territorial change—are more conducive to these groups remaining active than in the latter
period when terrorists raised the level of carnage, adopted harder-to-fulfill goals, and in-
duced governments to be more aggressive in countering terrorism. As such, we expect the
number of attacks per million persons to have a negative effect on terrorist groups’ survival
after 1990. Attack diversity may promote terrorist groups’ longevity during the era of the
leftists, but not during the era of the religious fundamentalists, when governments redoubled
their efforts to destroy terrorist groups. Terrorist group competition in the base countries is
more apt to reduce terrorist groups’ failure rates in the latter period as governments allo-
cated a significant portion of counterterrorism resources to defensive measures away from
proactive measures. Terrorist groups with multiple bases of operations are anticipated to
fare better before than after 1990, since the lesser threat posed by the leftist terrorist groups
meant that base-country governments were less inclined to pool their forces to eradicate res-
ident terrorists. After the start of 1990, terrorist groups moved some bases of operation to
failed or weak states, which aided their survival chances (Enders and Sandler 2012).
4 Methodology and data
We first present our empirical methodology, followed by the data and their sources.
4.1 Empirical methodology
Similar to Carter (2012), we estimate a competing risks model, for which an active terrorist
group faces alternative risks of leaving a given state. Each risk brings about a specific exit
destination. Define Tij as the latent duration for terrorist group i until it exits to destination j .
Tij is not observable directly; the data instead report Ti = min{Ti0, Ti1, . . . , TiJ }, along with
information on the cause of a terrorist group’s ending. There are three possible destination
states in our model: ending through military force or policing (j = 1), ending by splintering
(j = 2), or ending by joining political process or achieving victory (j = 3). If a group is still
active by the end of the sample period (j = 0), then the latent durations are right-censored.
We apply multinomial logit regressions to estimate the models (Long 2012; Train 2009).
Let Eih indicate a specific exit destination that terrorist group i experiences in a given year
h, so that Eih = j if Ti = Tij , j = 0,1,2,3. Then the probability that a terrorist group i
experiences event j is














where xih is a vector of explanatory variables for terrorist group i at year h; αj is a vector
of relevant parameters; and φ(h) is an unspecified duration function. We use a quadratic
duration function, φ(h) = φ0th + φ1t2h (h = 1,2, . . . , and t1 = 0), for the main regression
models and apply a piecewise constant specification as a robustness check.
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Next, we separate our sample into two subsamples for terrorist groups that formed during
1970–1989 and for those that formed during 1990–2007. We implement a logit regression to
estimate discrete-time hazard models for each subsample (Allison 1982; Jenkins 1995). Let
Ti denote a random variable measuring the duration of a terrorist group’s life in years. The
probability of a terrorist organization ending in a given time interval, [th, th+1), h = 1,2, . . . ,
and t1 = 0, is




1 + exp(xihλ + φ(h)
)]
. (2)
We also implement the random-effects logit regression to account for unobserved hetero-
geneity.
4.2 Data
Information on terrorist groups’ characteristics, their fates, and their base country or coun-
tries of operation comes from Jones and Libicki (2008). Data on terrorist groups’ attacks
are obtained from RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents (RAND 2012). Socio-
economic, political, and geographical data on the base country of operations are taken from
a number of sources, as detailed below. These datasets are merged into a panel of 586 ter-
rorist organizations for 1970–2007. At times, the same terrorist group has alternative names
reported in Jones and Libicki (2008) and in RAND (2012); hence, we painstakingly checked
terrorist groups’ names and made any necessary revisions to ensure that they matched prior
to merging the two datasets.
We construct group-specific variables using Jones and Libicki’s (2008) data, which pro-
vided information on when terrorist groups started, when they ended (if relevant), and how
they ended.6 This information is then used to create the dependent variable, which, for a
given year, is 0 if a group is active, 1 if a group is defeated by police or military, 2 if a group
splinters and disintegrates from internal factors, and 3 if a group ends either by joining the
political process or achieving victory. Only 25 sample terrorist groups ended with victory.
When joining the political process or obtaining victory, terrorist groups achieved some, but
not necessarily all, of their goals. We later perform robustness analysis and show that our
results are not sensitive to the exclusion of groups that ended in victory. For the two subpe-
riod samples, we use a dichotomous dependent variable, which is 0 if the terrorist group is
active and 1 if the group ends in any of the ways indicated above. The strength of a terror-
ist group is proxied by the logarithm of the group’s membership size at its peak, log(size).
Using Jones and Libicki’s (2008) classification of terrorist groups’ ideologies, we create
four dummy variables to indicate Left wing, Nationalist, Right wing, and Religious terrorist
groups. Additionally, we introduce four dummy variables to control for the main goals of
terrorist groups, as indicated in Jones and Libicki (2008). The multi-goal variable, ERCSR,
equals 1 if a terrorist group’s goal desires an empire, regime change, or social revolution,
and 0 otherwise. We combine these three goals since they are all ambitious and broad-based.
The three other dummy variables denote policy change (Policy change), territorial change
(Territ. change), and status quo (Status Quo). In our sample, the vast majority of terrorist
groups (73 %) had a single base country of operation, with less than 3 % of terrorist groups
having more than three bases. The dummy variable Multiple bases equals 1 if a terrorist
6Relative to Jones and Libicki (2008), we change the active status of two terrorist groups—the Ulster De-
fence Association and the Ulster Volunteer Force—as having joined the political process in 2007 when they
abandoned terrorism.
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group had two or more bases of operation, and equals 0 otherwise. To control for compe-
tition among terrorist groups that are based in the same country, we compute the average
number of other terrorist groups located in the same country and denote it by Group compet.
Data on the number and type of transnational terrorist incidents come from RAND
(2012). We analyze transnational terrorist attacks because RAND does not report domestic
terrorism prior to 1998. If we were to use the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) (National
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 2009), which has infor-
mation on both domestic and transnational terrorism, the number of terrorist groups in our
sample would be severely reduced. To capture the intensity of terrorist groups’ campaigns,
we compute the number of transnational terrorist incidents per million people (Terr/POP)
for each group. Data on population are taken from Penn World Table Version 7.0 (Heston
et al. 2011). Using information on seven types of terrorist attacks (bombings and arson,
kidnappings, barricade and hostage taking, skyjackings, assassinations, armed attacks, and
other attacks), we compute the diversity of terrorist attacks index (Attack diversity), which is
one minus the Hirschman-Herfindahl index. This index ranges between 0 and 1, with larger
values signifying greater diversity—see the computation method in Blomberg et al. (2011).
We also include variables associated with a terrorist group’s base country of operation,
which are averaged across base countries for groups with more than one base. The loga-
rithm of real per capita GDP [log(GDP/POP)], the logarithm of population [log(POP)],
and government spending as a percentage of GDP (Gov. spending) are obtained for each
year from the Penn World Table Version 7.0. Government spending partially captures the ef-
fect of counterterrorism; unfortunately, data on counterterrorism expenditure per se are not
available. We also use military expenditure as a percentage of GDP (Military expenditure)
(World Bank 2010) as an alternative proxy for counterterrorism efforts. Because military
spending data are not available for all sample years, we resort to this variable only in the
robustness analysis after the beginning of 1990. The Polity variable is included to control
for the degree of democracy (Marshall and Jaggers 2009), and ranges between −10 and
+10, with larger positive values indicative of stronger democracies. We also add an ethnic
fractionalization index (Ethnic frac.), in which larger values imply greater ethnic diversity
(Alesina et al. 2003). Finally, we include a host of variables to control for geological and
geographical characteristics of base countries. We construct regional dummy variables for
East Asia and Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and Caribbean, Middle East
and North Africa, North America, South Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa, based on World
Bank (2010) defined regions. We also include the logarithm of a country’s average eleva-
tion [log(elevation)], a country’s percentage share of tropical land territory (Tropics), and a
dummy variable indicating a country’s lack of direct access to international waters (Land-
locked) (Gallup et al. 1999a, 1999b).
Table 1 presents information on terrorist groups’ fates and characteristics. Around 36 %
of sample terrorist groups were active in 2007, 19 % were defeated militarily, 22 % splin-
tered, and 23 % joined the political process or achieved victory. On average, active terrorist
groups were larger in size than those that ended in defeat or splintered. These active terrorist
groups also faced stiffer competition in terms of the number of other groups in the same base
country. In contrast, terrorist groups that ended by political participation or victory were the
largest in size, but had fewer competitive terrorist groups in their base country. Splintered
terrorist groups confronted strong competition, but were small in membership size. The ma-
jority of terrorist groups that sought empire, regime change, or social revolution were active
at the end of the sample period. The same held true for terrorist groups that desired territorial
change. However, terrorist groups that sought changing a policy or maintaining the status
quo had a greater likelihood to end by joining the political forum or achieving victory. This
indicates a proclivity of governments to concede smaller demands to terrorist groups.
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Table 1 Terrorist groups’ characteristics and groups’ fate








Number Percentage Number Percentage
Active 213 36.35 11.45 798.03 70 23.73 143 49.14
Military/
Policing
110 18.77 5.01 362.64 77 26.10 33 11.34
Splintering 131 22.35 8.24 121.98 66 22.37 65 22.34
Politics/
Victory
132 22.53 3.97 1173.18 82 27.80 50 17.18
Total 586 100 295 100 291 100











Active 50 79 78 6 103 21 85 4
Military/
Policing
57 32 15 6 65 20 22 3
Splintering 47 55 26 3 66 28 34 3
Politics/
Victory
63 52 3 14 47 49 24 12
Note: ERCSR denotes Empire, Regime change, or Social Revolution
About 37 % of the sample terrorist groups were left-wing ideologically, 37 % were na-
tionalist, 21 % were religious, and 5 % were right wing. The majority of active terrorist
groups were either nationalist or religious. This holds true whether we look across or within
ideologies. The religious terrorist groups were relatively young; around 69 % of these groups
started after the beginning of 1990. Only three religious terrorist groups ended by joining
the political process, and these groups were established before 1990. No religious terrorist
group ended by victory in our sample. In contrast, larger shares of left-wing and right-wing
terrorist groups ended by joining the political process or achieving victory.
Our sample consists of 295 terrorist groups that started before 1990, and 291 terrorist
groups that started in 1990 or thereafter. More than half of active terrorist groups began
after the start of 1990. In both subperiods, left-wing and nationalist terrorist groups outnum-
bered religious and right-wing terrorist groups. The larger share of left-wing and nationalist
terrorist groups began before 1990, whereas the majority of religious and right-wing terror-
ist groups started after 1990. This confirms the rising dominance of religious fundamentalist
terrorist groups after 1990.
5 Results
Table 2 presents two specifications of the multinomial logit regression results. Model 1
includes group-specific variables along with base-country economic, demographic, and po-
litical variables. Model 2 adds regional and geographic variables, associated with the base
countries. For each model, columns “Military defeat,” “Splintering,” and “Politics/Victory”
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Table 2 Multinomial logit regressions of terrorist groups’ endings, 1970–2007









log(size) −0.423∗∗∗ −0.670∗∗∗ −0.193∗∗∗ −0.413∗∗∗ −0.678∗∗∗ −0.195∗∗∗
(0.075) (0.098) (0.057) (0.076) (0.102) (0.062)
Left wing 0.492 −0.519 1.786∗∗∗ 0.713∗ −0.639∗ 1.535∗∗
(0.341) (0.336) (0.612) (0.374) (0.373) (0.644)
Nationalist 0.758∗∗ 0.460 2.453∗∗∗ 0.615 0.459 2.273∗∗∗
(0.367) (0.319) (0.618) (0.399) (0.346) (0.644)
Right wing 0.655 −0.656 2.224∗∗∗ 0.808 −0.685 2.002∗∗∗
(0.541) (0.666) (0.668) (0.568) (0.687) (0.706)
ERCSR 0.183 0.640 −1.010∗∗∗ 0.249 0.398 −0.951∗∗
(0.649) (0.660) (0.389) (0.663) (0.687) (0.424)
Policy change −0.041 0.299 0.070 −0.190 0.166 0.337
(0.671) (0.674) (0.386) (0.697) (0.700) (0.430)
Territ. change −0.665 −0.247 −1.843∗∗∗ −0.555 −0.493 −1.478∗∗∗
(0.684) (0.659) (0.410) (0.694) (0.682) (0.457)
Terr/POP 0.046 0.135 0.003 0.086 0.131 0.045
(0.215) (0.103) (0.272) (0.185) (0.109) (0.253)
Multiple bases −0.461∗ −0.588∗∗ −0.189 −0.680∗∗ −0.496∗ −0.410
(0.248) (0.262) (0.230) (0.279) (0.280) (0.274)
Group compet. −0.045∗ 0.029 −0.076∗∗∗ −0.011 0.046∗ −0.032
(0.024) (0.018) (0.027) (0.030) (0.026) (0.031)
Attack diversity −0.170 −2.694 −1.940 −0.207 −2.617 −1.733
(1.044) (1.953) (1.361) (1.044) (1.958) (1.386)
log(GDP/POP) 0.347∗∗ 0.072 0.023 −0.144 0.032 0.246
(0.143) (0.144) (0.126) (0.229) (0.222) (0.213)
log(POP) 0.122 −0.213∗∗ −0.240∗∗∗ 0.086 −0.182 −0.262∗∗
(0.096) (0.085) (0.086) (0.131) (0.125) (0.129)
Gov. spending 3.122 −0.901 1.672 4.001∗ −0.921 1.801
(1.990) (2.614) (1.817) (2.372) (2.710) (1.939)
Polity −0.041∗∗ 0.008 0.021 −0.019 0.004 0.008
(0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.023) (0.025) (0.022)
Ethnic frac. 0.805 0.037 0.501 1.945∗∗ 0.233 −0.358
(0.552) (0.602) (0.487) (0.766) (0.833) (0.741)
East As. & Pa. 0.320 −0.169 0.548
(0.597) (0.726) (0.695)
Eur.& Cen. As. −0.268 0.654 1.030∗∗
(0.406) (0.416) (0.439)
Lat. Am. & Car. 0.485 −0.407 1.598∗∗∗
(0.463) (0.632) (0.548)
North America 0.668 −0.688 0.145
(0.472) (0.725) (0.552)
South Asia −1.061 −0.666 1.435∗∗
(0.720) (0.736) (0.722)
sub-Sah. Africa −0.336 −0.060 1.997∗∗∗
(0.688) (0.872) (0.613)
log(elevation) −0.838∗∗∗ 0.535∗∗ 0.091
(0.199) (0.251) (0.205)
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Table 2 (Continued)









Tropics −1.530∗∗∗ 0.539 −0.247
(0.533) (0.647) (0.492)
Landlocked 0.723 0.376 1.218∗∗∗
(0.513) (0.467) (0.360)
Time −0.048 −0.334∗∗∗ −0.194∗∗∗ −0.031 −0.324∗∗∗ −0.195∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.047) (0.036) (0.039) (0.047) (0.037)
Time squared 0.001 0.009∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.001 0.009∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant −6.692∗∗∗ 1.487 −0.699 2.793 −2.070 −4.055
(1.985) (2.014) (1.705) (2.937) (3.288) (3.070)
N 5605 5576
Notes: Significance levels: ∗∗∗ is <0.01, ∗∗ is <0.05, and ∗ is <0.10. Standard errors are in parentheses.
ERCSR denotes Empire, Regime change, or Social Revolution
display the variables’ estimates of the probability of a terrorist group ending by military
force or policing, by splintering, or by joining the political process or achieving victory,
respectively.
Terrorist group size has a negative and statistically significant impact on any of the alter-
native ways that terrorist groups may end. On average, larger terrorist groups are less likely
to end, which agrees with our theoretical expectations and past findings (see, e.g., Blomberg
et al. 2011; Gaibulloev and Sandler 2013; Jones and Libicki 2008; Phillips 2013). The statis-
tical significance of other variables differs across the three types of endings, which justifies
the novelty of our exercise and makes it difficult to compare our findings to those in the
literature, where these different endings are not distinguished. Left-wing, nationalist, and
right-wing terrorist groups are more likely than religious groups to end operations through
politics/victory, which concurs with our prior expectation; however, the effect of ideology is
not robust for military defeat and splintering.7 In Model 2, the effect of a left-wing ideology
is positive and significant on the probability of groups’ military defeat, but it is negative
and statistically significant on the likelihood of groups’ splintering. The impact of a nation-
alist ideology is positive and statistically significant on the probability of military defeat
in Model 1. Consistent with our priors, terrorist groups seeking empire, regime change, or
social revolution (ERCSR) and terrorist groups aiming for territorial change are less likely
to conclude their operations through politics/victory than terrorist groups seeking to main-
tain the status quo. Broad and demanding concessions are not granted, presumably owing
to large concomitant costs imposed on the government. The impact of the policy-change
goal is not a statistically significant determinant of the politics/victory outcome for terrorist
groups. For both models, the terrorist groups’ goal variables are not statistically significant
determinants of military defeat or splintering. Terrorist groups with more than one base of
operation are less apt to be eliminated by military force or to splinter, consistent with our
hypothesis. Multiple bases of operations provide the terrorist organization with resilience to
7It is not appropriate to compare our findings to those of Carter (2012), because the competing risks categories
and many of the variables in his article and our analysis differ.
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Fig. 1 Predicted probabilities of terrorist groups’ endings
external and internal threats; however, there is no statistically significant evidence to suggest
that these bases are conducive to the terrorist group joining the political process or achieving
victory.
Terrorist groups, based in countries with larger populations, are less apt to join the politi-
cal process or achieve victory, owing to more people holding other viewpoints. For our sam-
ple period, terrorist groups based in Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and Caribbean,
South Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa are more inclined to conclude by joining the political
process or achieving victory than terrorist groups based in the Middle East and North Africa.
This suggests a harder line against assimilating terrorist groups in the political process in
the latter region. Base-country elevation significantly reduces terrorist groups’ probability
of military defeat, but it significantly raises their probability of splintering. This may follow
because elevation provides cover, which may ward off military defeat, while higher eleva-
tion is associated with harsh conditions, which may foster internal strife within the group.
On average, terrorist groups based in countries with larger tropical areas are less likely to
end through military defeat presumably because of more cover. When terrorist groups are
based in landlocked countries, the prospect for joining the political process or achieving
victory (politics/victory) is bolstered, which may be due to geographical isolation encour-
aging compromise. The impacts of other variables are either not statistically significant or
not robust across models.
Before some age threshold, terrorist groups face a decreasing likelihood of ending by
splintering or politics/victory as they grow older. However, after this threshold, these groups
are increasingly prone to end by splintering or politics/victory as they grow older. The im-
pact of time on terrorist groups experiencing military defeat is not statistically significant.
The relationship between terrorist groups’ age and their endings is captured in Fig. 1, which
indicates the predicted probability of alternative endings at different terrorist groups’ ages,
holding other variables at their mean. In their early years, terrorist groups have a roughly
equal chance of ending by splintering or by politics/victory. As these groups age, their prob-
ability of joining the political process or achieving victory becomes ever larger than the
likelihood of splintering. In contrast, the likelihood of military defeat increases only slightly
as terrorist groups age.
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Table 3 Marginal effects for Model 2 in Table 2
Variable Military defeat Splintering Politics/victory
Marginal effect p-value Marginal effect p-value Marginal effect p-value
log(size)∗ −0.004 0.000 −0.003 0.000 −0.002 0.004
Left wing∗ 0.008 0.105 −0.003 0.072 0.018 0.064
Nationalist∗ 0.006 0.176 0.002 0.261 0.028 0.009
ERCSR∗ 0.003 0.705 0.002 0.570 −0.008 0.035
Territ. change∗ −0.005 0.423 −0.002 0.479 −0.012 0.003
Multiple bases∗ −0.007 0.015 −0.002 0.097 −0.003 0.140
Group compet. 0.000 0.725 0.000 0.093 0.000 0.298
log(POP) 0.001 0.499 −0.001 0.168 −0.002 0.054
Gov. spending 0.042 0.098 −0.004 0.719 0.015 0.365
Ethnic frac. 0.020 0.013 0.001 0.795 −0.003 0.608
Eur. & Cen. As.∗ −0.003 0.458 0.003 0.203 0.012 0.081
Lat. Am. & Car.∗ 0.006 0.394 −0.002 0.433 0.025 0.088
South Asia∗ −0.009 0.056 −0.002 0.277 0.020 0.206
log(elevation) −0.009 0.000 0.002 0.043 0.001 0.634
Tropics −0.016 0.006 0.002 0.397 −0.002 0.635
Landlocked∗ 0.007 0.169 0.002 0.453 0.010 0.002
Notes: Statistically significant estimates and their probability values are boldfaced. ERCSR denotes Empire,
Regime change, or Social Revolution. ∗ denotes dummy variable. The effect for dummy variable is the dis-
crete change from the base level. Only statistically significant variables are presented to save space. See
Model 2 in Table 2 for the complete specification
The marginal effects for Model 2 are presented in Table 3, where only the variables with
one or more statistically significant effects are displayed to conserve space. The terrorist
groups’ probability of ending in the three alternative ways reduces by about 0.02 to 0.04
percentage points in response to a 10 % increase in group size. The data on terrorist group
size are given in increments of 10, 100, 1,000, and 10,000. We also examine the predicted
probability of various endings for different terrorist group sizes, holding the other variables
at their mean. The predicted probability of ending militarily decreases from 0.03 to 0.01, or
by 66.7 %, as group size increases from 10 to 100. A similar change in predicted probabil-
ity characterizes splintering. For politics/victory, the change in the predicted likelihood is
around 28.6 %. The reduction in the predicted probability is more pronounced as terrorist
groups become large; e.g., the likelihood of defeat by force reduces to 0.002 for a terrorist
group of 10,000 members. Left-wing and nationalist terrorist groups are about two and three
percentage points more likely, respectively, to join the political process or achieve victory
than a religious fundamentalist group. Terrorist groups that seek ERCSR or territorial change
are one percentage point less inclined to terminate their operations by politics/victory than
groups that aim to maintain the status quo. Other statistically significant marginal impacts
in Table 3 are interpreted in a similar fashion.
Table 4 indicates the terrorist groups’ predicted probabilities of ending through poli-
tics/victory, based on their ideologies and goals (i.e., ERCSR and territorial change). Among
terrorist groups that desire ERCSR, nationalist groups have the largest likelihood of ending
by politics/victory. Religious terrorist groups have the smallest probability of ending by pol-
itics/victory; however, the predicted probability is not statistically significant. Left-wing and
right-wing terrorist groups desiring ERCSR have larger likelihoods of concluding through
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Table 4 Predicted probabilities of ending via politics/victory by ideology and goal
Ideology Goal
ERCSR p-value Territorial change p-value
Religious 0.002 0.103 0.001 0.134
Left wing 0.009 0.000 0.005 0.007
Nationalist 0.018 0.000 0.011 0.000
Right wing 0.014 0.009 0.008 0.021
Religious − Left wing −0.007 0.004 −0.004 0.025
Religious − Nationalist −0.016 0.001 −0.010 0.000
Religious − Right wing −0.012 0.026 −0.007 0.041
Notes: ERCSR denotes Empire, Regime change, or Social Revolution. The cell corresponding to Religious
and ERCSR is computed by holding other ideology and goal variables at zero and all other variables at their
means. Other predicted probabilities are computed similarly
politics/victory than religious terrorist groups, and this difference in predicted probabilities
is statistically significant. Similarly, for terrorist groups seeking territorial change, the pre-
dicted probability of politics/victory is smaller for religious terrorist groups than for nation-
alist, right-wing, or left-wing terrorist groups. These differences in predicted probabilities
are statistically significant.
We next perform a number of robustness checks. When we remove the 25 terrorist groups
that ended in victory from the politics/victory category, the results remain essentially un-
changed. Because of data availability concerns, our sample begins in 1970 even though
some sample terrorist groups started their operations prior to 1970. When we exclude these
pre-1970 groups, the results generally hold (available upon request).
In Table 2, duration dependence is specified as a quadratic. To investigate the sensitiv-
ity of our results to this time-dependent specification, we re-estimate Model 2 of Table 2
using a piecewise constant specification. These regression estimates correspond to Model 1
of Table 5, where our primary results are maintained. A potential endogeneity issue may
arise with some variables; e.g., the portion of government spending allocated to national
security may be affected by the terrorist groups’ fates. Since finding proper instruments is
a formidable challenge, we re-estimate Model 2 of Table 2 using lagged values of all time-
varying variables—see Model 2 in Table 5.8 For the military defeat outcome, all previous
results hold except for ethnic fractionalization. Furthermore, some ideological variables,
GDP per capita, and regional dummy variables become statistically significant. In the case
of internal splintering, the left-wing, multiple bases, and elevation variables are no longer
statistically significant. Group size, ERCSR, and landlocked variables are not statistically
significant determinants of joining the political process or achieving victory, but GDP per
capita and polity become statistically significant determinants.
In the literature, a state sponsorship variable was found to be a statistically significant
determinant of terrorist groups’ duration (Carter 2012; Phillips 2013). We use data from
Phillips (2013) to construct a state sponsorship dummy variable, which is 1 if a terrorist
group received state support at some point in time, and 0 otherwise. We re-estimate Table 2
(and later Table 6) by including our state sponsorship variable. In so doing, we note that
8Group size is also potentially endogenous, but we cannot lag this variable, since we have only a single peak
size measurement for each terrorist group.
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Table 5 Robustness analysis, 1970–2007









log(size) −0.402∗∗∗ −0.828∗∗∗ −0.226∗∗∗ −0.353∗∗∗ −0.497∗∗∗ −0.039
Left wing 0.869∗∗ −0.728∗ 1.713∗∗∗ 0.967∗∗ 0.644 1.207∗
Nationalist 0.717∗ 0.715∗∗ 2.652∗∗∗ 0.884∗ 0.944∗ 1.798∗∗
Right wing 0.979∗ −0.735 2.179∗∗∗ 1.237∗∗ 0.721 2.208∗∗∗
ERCSR 0.215 −0.030 −1.067∗∗ 0.097 0.389 −0.572
Policy change −0.268 −0.231 0.325 −0.411 0.650 0.663
Territ. change −0.519 −1.184∗ −1.744∗∗∗ −0.762 −0.420 −1.396∗∗
Terr/POP 0.097 0.194∗ 0.088 0.109 0.032 −0.932
Multiple bases −0.666∗∗ −0.795∗∗∗ −0.438 −0.744∗∗ −0.125 0.230
Group compet. −0.022 0.054∗ −0.037 0.003 0.095∗∗ 0.059
Attack diversity −0.109 −3.313 −1.384 −1.476 3.014∗∗∗ −0.527
log(GDP/POP) −0.190 0.030 0.308 −0.483∗ 0.088 0.654∗∗
log(POP) 0.082 −0.215∗ −0.297∗∗ 0.182 −0.279 −0.466∗∗
Gov. spending 3.885 −3.795 1.592 5.529∗∗ −2.945 −1.375
Polity −0.023 −0.001 −0.015 −0.002 −0.020 −0.053∗
Ethnic frac. 1.783∗∗ 0.669 −0.556 1.181 2.517∗ −1.311
East As. & Pa. 0.295 −0.030 0.634 0.119 −13.072 1.046
Eur. & Cen. As. −0.340 0.610 0.932∗∗ −0.401 0.854 1.121∗
Lat. Am. & Car. 0.510 −0.349 1.534∗∗∗ 0.586 −0.378 1.913∗∗∗
North America 0.877∗ −1.093 0.032 0.949∗ −1.667 −0.047
South Asia −1.080 −0.825 1.341∗ −2.118∗∗ −0.750 2.279∗∗
sub-Sah. Africa −0.380 0.090 1.763∗∗∗ −0.379 −0.788 2.664∗∗∗
log(elevation) −0.853∗∗∗ 0.497∗ 0.096 −0.639∗∗∗ −0.292 0.244
Tropics −1.670∗∗∗ 0.181 −0.300 −1.964∗∗∗ −0.268 0.722
Landlocked 0.663 0.673 1.413∗∗∗ 0.630 1.199∗ 0.746
N 5576 5036
Notes: Significance levels: ∗∗∗ is <0.01, ∗∗ is <0.05, and ∗ is <0.10. Standard errors, constant, and time
variables are suppressed. ERCSR denotes Empire, Regime change, or Social Revolution. Model 1 uses piece-
wise constant specification (dummy variables for 1970–1979, 1980–1989, 1990–1999, and 2000–2007) and
Model 2 uses lagged value of Terr/POP, Group compet., Attack diversity, log(GDP/POP), log(POP), and
Gov. spending
Phillips used a different sample of terrorist groups and a different sample period. These dif-
ferences pose a challenge for us identifying the state sponsorship status for all of our sample
terrorist groups. Therefore, we are understandably cautious about interpreting the findings
with respect to our state sponsorship variable. Nevertheless, our results are generally robust
to the inclusion of this variable (available upon request). The sign of the state sponsorship
coefficient is negative, consistent with the results in Phillips (2013).
Next, we divide our sample into two subsamples: terrorist groups that began before and
after the start of 1990. This allows us to investigate the era of the leftist and national-
ist/separatist terrorists separately from that of the religious fundamentalist terrorists. This
division of the sample period also distinguishes the period of some state sponsorship before
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1990 from the period of much less state sponsorship after the start of 1990. The dependent
variable is a dummy, indicating whether a terrorist group ended in a given year. Unfortu-
nately the restricted sample size does not permit us to investigate the specific manner in
which a group ended.9 Based on a quadratic duration dependence specification, Table 6
presents the logit regression results.
During its early years, the likelihood of a terrorist group ending in a given year falls with
its age; this follows from the statistically significant quadratic time terms in Table 6 and
holds for both periods. After an age threshold, every additional year of activity raises the
possibility that the group will end in the ensuing period. For both time periods, nationalist
terrorist groups are more apt to cease their activities than religious terrorist groups, which
supports our theoretical argument. This finding is more statistically significant for the ear-
lier period. The impacts of the other ideological variables are not robust—i.e., left-wing and
right-wing terrorist groups are more likely to end relative to religious terrorist groups in the
initial period for Model 1, but not for Model 2. For both periods and models, the size of
the terrorist group bolsters its survival. There are other noticeable differences in findings for
the two periods. Prior to 1990, terrorist groups striving for ERCSR or territorial change are
less likely to terminate operations than terrorist groups that seek maintaining the status quo.
During this earlier period, having multiple bases of operations, diversifying attacks, and lo-
cating in populous countries are conducive to terrorist groups’ survival, whereas locating in
a landlocked country is not conducive to their survival. The impact of the Latin America
& Caribbean and sub-Saharan Africa dummy variables are positive and statistically signif-
icant at the 10 % level, indicating that terrorist groups in these regions are more inclined
to end relative to those in the Middle East and North Africa. These results are not statisti-
cally significant for terrorist groups that began operations after 1990. After the beginning of
1990, transnational terrorist attacks per capita increase the likelihood that terrorist groups
end, presumably because their increased activity exposes them to more risks and enhanced
proactive responses from the authorities. Alternatively, increased attacks may motivate the
government to allow the terrorist group to join the political process. Competition among
terrorist groups significantly reduces the groups’ probability of termination, presumably be-
cause the authorities’ proactive forces are spread thin as they must confront more indigenous
terrorist groups. Greater competition among terrorist groups may work against these groups’
ability to join the political process, insofar as each group may capture a smaller following.
Moreover, with more alternative viewpoints, there may be less need for a terrorist group
to splinter, since other options may already exist. The results across the two subsamples
generally support our priors.
We also check the results by using lagged values of time-varying variables. For terror-
ist groups in the initial sample period, the impacts of attack diversity, population, and two
regional indicator variables, which are marginally significant in Model 2 in Table 6, are no
longer significant. The landlocked variable also becomes statistically insignificant, whereas
the polity and elevation variables are now statistically significant. For the pre-1990 period,
the other results hold after lagging. For groups started after the beginning of 1990, previously
statistically significant variables, except for terrorist group competition, remain statistically
significant when we lag time-varying variables. Moreover, left-wing, right-wing, territorial
9Each sample period now has fewer than 300 groups (see Table 1). Furthermore, our main variables of
interest, such as groups’ ideologies and goals, have little variation among alternative endings. For example,
among right-wing terrorist groups that started after 1990, only a single group splintered and only two groups
were defeated militarily.
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Table 6 Logit regressions of terrorist groups’ endings
Variable Groups started before 1990 Groups started after 1990
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
log(size) −0.365∗∗∗ −0.377∗∗∗ −0.468∗∗∗ −0.468∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.055) (0.114) (0.115)
Left wing 0.804∗∗ 0.565 0.043 0.036
(0.350) (0.406) (0.405) (0.454)
Nationalist 1.526∗∗∗ 1.236∗∗∗ 0.643∗ 0.741∗
(0.319) (0.358) (0.368) (0.438)
Right wing 0.999∗∗ 0.678 0.339 0.399
(0.457) (0.503) (0.531) (0.574)
ERCSR −0.881∗∗ −0.847∗∗ −0.131 −0.152
(0.399) (0.410) (0.478) (0.563)
Policy change −0.433 −0.295 0.028 0.123
(0.415) (0.439) (0.501) (0.578)
Territ. change −2.221∗∗∗ −1.992∗∗∗ −0.289 −0.384
(0.418) (0.430) (0.504) (0.568)
Terr/POP 0.056 0.082 4.245∗∗∗ 4.171∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.052) (1.510) (1.464)
Multiple bases −0.502∗∗∗ −0.755∗∗∗ −0.134 −0.073
(0.183) (0.222) (0.268) (0.314)
Group compet. 0.001 0.039 −0.059∗∗∗ −0.073∗∗
(0.023) (0.026) (0.019) (0.032)
Attack diversity −1.709∗∗ −1.556∗ −1.914 −1.331
(0.792) (0.832) (3.011) (2.906)
log(GDP/POP) 0.109 0.101 0.022 0.076
(0.111) (0.238) (0.139) (0.203)
log(POP) −0.200∗∗∗ −0.220∗ 0.063 0.145
(0.070) (0.117) (0.085) (0.150)
Gov. spending 1.737 1.923 2.521 1.205
(1.252) (1.418) (2.749) (3.431)
Polity 0.008 −0.003 −0.004 0.008
(0.016) (0.018) (0.027) (0.035)
Ethnic frac. 0.870∗∗ 0.922 0.451 0.533
(0.393) (0.655) (0.618) (0.911)
East As. & Pa. 0.478 −0.178
(0.628) (0.743)
Eur. & Cen. As. 0.553 −0.190
(0.369) (0.464)
Lat. Am. & Car. 0.787∗ −0.035
(0.436) (0.693)
North America 0.212 −0.397
(0.457) (0.831)
South Asia −0.229 0.314
(0.674) (0.643)
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Table 6 (Continued)
Variable Groups started before 1990 Groups started after 1990
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Landlocked 0.900∗∗ 0.833
(0.352) (0.536)
Time −0.143∗∗∗ −0.140∗∗∗ −0.464∗∗∗ −0.451∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.027) (0.083) (0.085)
Time squared 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005)
Constant 0.400 1.726 −0.357 −1.644
(1.592) (3.158) (2.000) (3.113)
N 4115 4115 1490 1461
Notes: Significance levels: ∗∗∗ is <0.01, ∗∗ is <0.05, and ∗ is <0.10. Robust standard errors are in parenthe-
ses. ERCSR denotes Empire, Regime change, or Social Revolution
change, and polity variables become statistically significant with signs that agree with pre-
vious results. In addition, we replace government spending with lagged military expenditure
after 1990. This lagged variable is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that mili-
tary expenditure hastens the demise of terrorist groups. We cannot use military expenditure
prior to 1990 because data are not available. We implement a random-effects logit regres-
sion to account for unobserved heterogeneity. In general, our results are not sensitive to this
change. The exceptions are ERCSR before the start of 1990, and the nationalist and terrorist
attack variables after 1990, which are no longer statistically significant. Finally, previous
results generally hold if we include the state sponsorship variable. All of these results are
available upon request.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper extends previous work on terrorist groups’ survival to investigate why terrorist
groups end in particular ways—defeat by force, splintering from within, and joining the po-
litical process or achieving victory. Terrorist groups not succumbing to one of these endings
remain active and, thus, pose a risk to the public. Based on multinomial logit regressions
of competing risks and a logit regression of terrorist group survival, we estimate the hazard
probability for a sample of 586 terrorist groups for 1970–2007 and two subsample periods.
These latter periods involve terrorist groups that formed before and after the beginning of
1990.
A number of policy conclusions follow from our results. First, terrorist group size matters
for survival; group size has the largest marginal impact for terrorist groups to avoid being
defeated by force. For every subsample, group size adds to survival prospects, thereby in-
dicating that it is essential for governments to keep incipient groups from growing. Second,
covariates affect the alternative fates of terrorist groups differently. As such, this multino-
mial analysis can inform policymakers about the likely fates of terrorist groups, so that these
policymakers know where to concentrate scarce counterterrorism resources. For example,
terrorist groups seeking broad or territorial goals are not likely to join the political process,
nor are they apt to end by force or splintering. This then suggests that these terrorist groups
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present an ongoing threat that demands more counterterrorism measures. Relative to reli-
gious fundamentalist terrorist groups, nationalist terrorist groups are prone to end by force
or joining the political process, which indicates that some of these nationalist groups may
give up terrorism through negotiation or the promise of amnesty. Religious fundamentalist
terrorist groups represent the greatest current threat and are the most resilient. Thus, more
counterterrorism measures must be directed to these terrorist groups. Third, terrorist groups
with multiple bases are unlikely to end by force or splintering. This suggests that the author-
ities must work with their counterparts in other countries to inhibit these multiple bases from
forming if the terrorist group is to remain more vulnerable to proactive measures. Fourth,
within the base country, terrorist group competition inhibits political solutions, thereby en-
couraging the authorities to try to create dissent within the terrorist group to promote internal
dissolution. Fifth, terrorist groups in the Middle East and North Africa are less likely to join
the political process when compared to other regions. The recent geographical shift of terror-
ist activities to this region after 9/11 has ominous implications for terrorist groups’ longevity
(Enders and Sandler 2012). As a consequence, more international actions are required to ad-
dress this development. Sixth, geological and geographical considerations—base-country
elevation and tropics—protect terrorist groups from being defeated by force. This suggests
either the need for greater proactive measures or else a willingness on the part of the author-
ities to negotiate a settlement in countries with these characteristics.
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